There is no need to say much about the extent to which a certain shared conception of justice, including principles of equity and natural responsibility, and a universal awareness of people's willingness to act in accordance with that conception of justice, has become a great collective asset. I have already pointed out a number of advantages from the point of view of the issue of guaranteed compliance. However, it is also clear that people, because of their mutual trust, can use their universal recognition of these principles to greatly expand the scope and value of mutually beneficial cooperation arrangements. Therefore, from the point of view of the original state, it is obviously reasonable that the parties are in favor of the principle of fairness. This principle can be used to safeguard these undertakings in a way that is consistent with freedom of choice and without unnecessarily increasing moral requirements. At the same time, if there is a principle of equity, we can see why there is a custom of commitment as a method of imposing obligations in cases of mutual benefit. Such an arrangement is clearly in the common interest. I will consider that these considerations provide sufficient arguments in favour of the principle of equity. Before turning to the issue of political responsibility and accountability, there are a few more points that I should make. First, as the discussion of commitment shows, contract theory holds that no moral claim arises from the existence of institutions alone. Even the rule of commitment cannot by itself create a moral obligation. In order to explain the obligation of credit, we must take the principle of fairness as the premise. In this way, like most ethical theories,304 stainless steel wire, the theory of justice as fairness holds that natural responsibilities and obligations arise entirely from ethical principles. These principles are the ones that may be selected in the original state. These criteria, together with the relevant factual circumstances available, determine our obligations and responsibilities and single out the perceived moral grounds. A (correct) moral reason is a fact that one or more of these principles think can be used to help make a judgment. The correct moral decision, if it applies to all the facts it considers relevant, is the decision most consistent with the requirements of the set of principles. As a result, a ground identified by one principle may be endorsed, rejected,stainless steel welded pipe, or even nullified by a ground identified by one or more other principles. But I think it is possible to pick out from the whole, and in a sense probably the infinite, a finite or inspectable number of facts as relevant to any particular case. In this way, the whole approach enables us to make a certain judgement after thorough consideration. In contrast, the determination of institutional requirements, the determination of requirements from social customs, can generally be based on existing rules or on the way these rules are interpreted. For example, if the nature of law can be determined, then as citizens, our legal responsibilities and obligations will be determined by the nature of law. The standards that apply to competitors are determined by the rules of the game. Whether these requirements are linked to moral duties and obligations is another question. This is true even if the criteria used by judges and others to interpret and apply the law are similar to, or the same as, 304 Stainless Steel Bar ,Stainless Steel Seamless Pipe, the principles of legality and justice. Of course, another ethical theory can also deduce this principle without the original state view. For the time being,mirror stainless steel sheet, I need not insist that the credit relationship cannot be explained in any other way. On the contrary, I would like to point out that even if the justice-as-fairness theory uses the concept of the original agreement, it can still give a satisfactory answer to Pritchard's question. Section 53 Duty to comply with unjust laws. sxthsteel.com